| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17517 |
| DP17517 Free entry in a Cournot market with overlapping ownership | |
| Xavier Vives; Orestis Vravosinos | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the effects of overlapping ownership in a Cournot oligopoly with free entry. If firms develop overlapping ownership only after entering, then an increase in the degree of overlapping ownership spurs entry but causes price to increase and total surplus to fall. Also, entry is never insufficient by more than one firm as in the case without overlapping ownership. If potential entrants have overlapping ownership before entering, then an increase in their degree of overlapping ownership can limit or spur entry. Although entry is excessive under non-decreasing returns to scale, with decreasing returns to scale entry is insufficient under high levels of overlapping ownership. Under common assumptions, we find that pre-entry (resp. post-entry) overlapping ownership magnifies (resp. alleviates) the negative impact of an increase of entry costs on entry. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Common ownership Minority shareholdings Oligopoly Entry Competition policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17517 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546601 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives,Orestis Vravosinos. DP17517 Free entry in a Cournot market with overlapping ownership. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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