| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0110 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0110 |
| The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective | |
| William M. Landes; Richard A. Posner | |
| 发表日期 | 1975-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1975 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0110 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William M. Landes,Richard A. Posner. The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective. 1975. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0110.pdf（445KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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