| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w0133
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0133
|
| Toward a More General Theory of Regulation |
| Sam Peltzman
|
| 发表日期 | 1976-04-01
|
| 出版年 | 1976
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In previous literature, George Stigler asserts a law of diminishing returns to group size in politics: Beyond some point it becomes counterproductive to dilute the per capita transfer. Since the total transfer is endogenous, there is a corollary that dirninishing returns apply to the transfer as well, due both to the opposition provoked by the transfer and to the demand this opposition exerts on resources to quiet it. Stigler does not himself formalize this model, and my first task will be to do just this. My simplified formal version of his model produces a result to which Stigler gave only passing recognition, namely that the costs of using the political process limit not only the size of the dominant group but also their gains. This is at one level, a detail, which is the way Stigler treated it, but a detail with some important implications -- for entry into regulation, and for the price-output structure that emerges from regulation. The main task of the paper is to derive these implications from a generalization of Stigler's model. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0133
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557329
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Sam Peltzman. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. 1976.
|
|
文件名：
|
w0133.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
