| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0144 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0144 |
| Optimal Income Redistribution When Individual Welfare Depends Upon Relative Income | |
| Michael J. Boskin; Eytan Sheshinski | |
| 发表日期 | 1976-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1976 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The purpose of the present note is to explore the structure of optimal income taxation/redistribution in an economy where the welfare of individuals depends in part on relative after-tax consumption, i.e., we specify individual welfare as a function of absolute and relative after-tax consumption, with diminishing marginal utility to each. With such a specification, of course, an additional incentive for income redistribution from wealthy to poor citizens is created and the logical impossibility of increasing tax rates to the point where disincentive effects actually reduce tax revenues is potentially removed. The analysis highlights the importance of the marginal valuation placed on upward social mobility in various ranges of the income distribution and its interaction with the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption; of course, "labor supply" elasticities, the form of the social welfare function, and the skill distribution continue to play an important role. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0144 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557338 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael J. Boskin,Eytan Sheshinski. Optimal Income Redistribution When Individual Welfare Depends Upon Relative Income. 1976. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0144.pdf（159KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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