| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0623 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0623 |
| Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675) | |
| Jerry R. Green | |
| 发表日期 | 1981 |
| 出版年 | 1981 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. However, employment is above rather than below the efficient level when the conditions of profitability are worse than average. Such a one- period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as it is traditionally conceived. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0623 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557823 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerry R. Green. Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675). 1981. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0623.pdf（197KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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