G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w0675
来源IDWorking Paper 0675
Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results
Jerry R. Green; Charles M. Kahn
发表日期1981-05-01
出版年1981
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms ' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. It is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral, employment is always above the efficient level. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information.
主题Other ; Macroeconomics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w0675
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557877
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GB/T 7714
Jerry R. Green,Charles M. Kahn. Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results. 1981.
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