| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0675 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0675 |
| Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results | |
| Jerry R. Green; Charles M. Kahn | |
| 发表日期 | 1981-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1981 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms ' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. It is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral, employment is always above the efficient level. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information. |
| 主题 | Other ; Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0675 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/557877 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerry R. Green,Charles M. Kahn. Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results. 1981. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0675.pdf（212KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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