| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0840 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0840 |
| A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts | |
| Jerry R. Green; Nancy L. Stokey | |
| 发表日期 | 1982 |
| 出版年 | 1982 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates using the optimal tournament. Conversely, if the distribution of the common shock is sufficiently diffuse, using the optimal tournament dominates using optimal independent contracts. Finally, it is shown that for a sufficiently large number of agents, a principal who cannot observe the common shock but uses the optimal tournament, does as well as one who can observe the shock and uses independent contracts. |
| 主题 | Other ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0840 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558052 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerry R. Green,Nancy L. Stokey. A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts. 1982. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0840.pdf（179KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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