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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w0871 |
来源ID | Working Paper 0871 |
Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of \"Rival\" Enterprises | |
Ariel Pakes; Shmuel Nitzan | |
发表日期 | 1982-03-01 |
出版年 | 1982 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward to analyze the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his employer to set up (or join) a rival. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Industrial Organization |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0871 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558083 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ariel Pakes,Shmuel Nitzan. Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of \"Rival\" Enterprises. 1982. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w0871.pdf(393KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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