G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w0871
来源IDWorking Paper 0871
Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of \"Rival\" Enterprises
Ariel Pakes; Shmuel Nitzan
发表日期1982-03-01
出版年1982
语种英语
摘要This paper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward to analyze the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his employer to set up (or join) a rival.
主题Labor Economics ; Industrial Organization
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w0871
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558083
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GB/T 7714
Ariel Pakes,Shmuel Nitzan. Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of \"Rival\" Enterprises. 1982.
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