| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w0927 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 0927 |
| Economic Implications of ERISA | |
| Jeremy I. Bulow; Myron S. Scholes; Peter Menell | |
| 发表日期 | 1982-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1982 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | If the intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ERISA, was to assure that beneficiaries of insolvent pension plans receive adequate pension benefits, sharp increases in nominal rates of interest have blunted that purpose. Without an increase in these rates, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC, the insurance agency established to guarantee benefits, faced large liabilities on the terminations of pension plans. We examine the economics of pension funds and the funding of pension funds before and after the enactment of ERISA. The Act changed the economics of pension funds. The PBGC, the employer, and the employees have interests in the assets of the pension plan. The PBGC can tax corporations to pay off liabilities and to fund guaranteed benefits; employers can terminate pension plans or overfund them; employees can ask for more benefits or claim the assets in the fund. Although the PBGC insures benefits, the insurance agent forbears, not acting quickly to protect its own interests. To prevent potential huge increases in its liabilities, the PBGC could require that employers hedge the guaranteed benefits, and fund their increases in promised benefits. Given its policies, these requirements could protect the PBGC. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w0927 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558143 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy I. Bulow,Myron S. Scholes,Peter Menell. Economic Implications of ERISA. 1982. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w0927.pdf（321KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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