| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w1079 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1079 |
| Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy | |
| Robert J. Barro; David B. Gordon | |
| 发表日期 | 1983-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1983 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymaker's incentives and form their expectations accordingly. Because the policymaker has the power to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise. Therefore, enforced commitments (rules) for monetary behavior can improve matters. Given the repeated interaction between the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules.Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the out-comes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates of inflation and monetary growth look more like those under discretion when the discount rate is high. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1079 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558299 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert J. Barro,David B. Gordon. Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. 1983. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w1079.pdf（249KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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