| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w1213
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1213
|
| Capital Allocation in Mult-Division Firms: Hurdle Rates vs. Budgets |
| Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
|
| 发表日期 | 1983-10-01
|
| 出版年 | 1983
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | It is common practice for firms to ration capital funds to their divisions, rather than set a price and let the divisions use as much as they want. This appears to be true even when the overall firm faces no rationing in the capital market. This paper offers an interpretation of this phenomenon based on Martin Weitzman's "Prices vs. Quantities" model. It is found that a rationing systemis advantageous when division managers do not perceive the full consequences of their investment decisions for the firm as a whole. By contrast, a pricing system for allocating capital among divisions would be favored when the division managers possess valuable information that cannot be costlessly communicated to headquarters. It is then argued that actual capital budgeting practice in many firms reflects a mixture of these two systems and can thus be interpreted as an attempt to reap both kinds of benefits at once. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1213
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558437
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Robert A. Taggart, Jr.. Capital Allocation in Mult-Division Firms: Hurdle Rates vs. Budgets. 1983.
|
|
文件名：
|
w1213.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
