全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w1359
来源ID	Working Paper 1359
	Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information
	Motty Perry; Gary Solon
发表日期	1984-05-01
出版年	1984
语种	英语
摘要	This paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage. Under specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover. In addition, aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs.These results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity, long-term contracting, or aggregate price misperceptions.
主题	Labor Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w1359
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558590
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Motty Perry,Gary Solon. Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information. 1984.