| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w1412 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1412 |
| A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms | |
| Julio J. Rotemberg; Garth Saloner | |
| 发表日期 | 1984-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1984 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally deflate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation,the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times,resulting in lower prices. If the oligopolists' output is an input to other sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co-movements of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880's, the automobile industry in the 1950's and the cyclical behavior of cement prices and price-cost margins support our theory. (J.E.L. Classification numbers:020, 130, 610). |
| 主题 | Other ; Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1412 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558646 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julio J. Rotemberg,Garth Saloner. A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms. 1984. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w1412.pdf（342KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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