| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w1417
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 1417
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| International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models |
| Gilles Oudiz; Jeffrey Sachs
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| 发表日期 | 1984-08-01
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| 出版年 | 1984
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Recent analyses of the gains to policy coordination have focussed on the strategic aspects of macroeconomic policy making in a static setting. A major theme is that noncooperative policy making is likely to be Pareto inefficient because of the presence of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper extends the analysis to a dynamic setting, thereby introducing three important points of realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to beggar-thy-neighbor policies look very different in one-period and multiperiod games, and thus so do the gains to coordination. Second, we show that policy coordination may reduce economic welfare if governments are nyopic in their policy making, as is sometimes claimed. Third, governments act under a fundamental constraint that they cannot bind the actions of later governments, and we investigate how this constraint alters the gains to policy coordination. |
| 主题 | International Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1417
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558651
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gilles Oudiz,Jeffrey Sachs. International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models. 1984.
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文件名：
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w1417.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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