| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w1633 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1633 |
| Hospital Cost and Efficiency Under Per Service and Per Case Payment in Maryland: A Tale of the Carrot and the Stick | |
| David S. Salkever; Donald M. Steinwachs; Agnes Rupp | |
| 发表日期 | 1985-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1985 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The simultaneous operation of per case and per servicepayment systems in Maryland, and the varying levels of stringency used in setting per case rates allows comparison of effects of differing incentive structures on hospital costs. This paper presents such a comparison with 1977-1981 data. Cost per case and total cost regressions show evidence of lower costs only when per case payment limits are very stringent. Positive net revenue incentives appear insufficient to induce reductions in length of stay and in ancillary services use. Our results suggest these changes in medical practice patterns are more likely under the threat of financial losses. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1633 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558876 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David S. Salkever,Donald M. Steinwachs,Agnes Rupp. Hospital Cost and Efficiency Under Per Service and Per Case Payment in Maryland: A Tale of the Carrot and the Stick. 1985. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w1633.pdf（257KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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