| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w1744
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 1744
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| Labor Supply Incentives and Disincentives for the Disabled |
| Jonathan S. Leonard
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| 发表日期 | 1985-10-01
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| 出版年 | 1985
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The past three decades have witnessed a large and puzzling decline in labor force participation by prime-age males, and a correspondingly large increase in Social Security disability beneficiary roles.This paper reviews the analytical studies that have attempted to determine the causal links between disability, beneficiary status, and labor-force non-participation. Although disability is often thought of as a purely medically determined condition with no labor supply responsiveness to economic factors, models of Social Security disability beneficiary status as an economic decision have had some success in explaining both the growth of the program and the decline in labor force participation. These studies have, however, produced a wide range of estimates of labor supply elasticity, in part because of the difficulty of the underlying econometric problem of estimating the response to two (or more) potential income streams, only one of which is usually observed for any individual. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics
; Public Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1744
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/558988
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jonathan S. Leonard. Labor Supply Incentives and Disincentives for the Disabled. 1985.
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文件名：
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w1744.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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