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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w1870
来源IDWorking Paper 1870
An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes
Joseph S. Tracy
发表日期1986-03-01
出版年1986
语种英语
摘要Recent developments in the thoery of strategic bargaining demonstrate howinformational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations between unions and firms yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. This paper presents some evidence supporting this view of strikes. A set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model where the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations which took place from 1973 to 1977.
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w1870
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559117
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GB/T 7714
Joseph S. Tracy. An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes. 1986.
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