| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w1870
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1870
|
| An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes |
| Joseph S. Tracy
|
| 发表日期 | 1986-03-01
|
| 出版年 | 1986
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Recent developments in the thoery of strategic bargaining demonstrate howinformational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations between unions and firms yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. This paper presents some evidence supporting this view of strikes. A set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model where the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations which took place from 1973 to 1977. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1870
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559117
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Joseph S. Tracy. An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes. 1986.
|
|
文件名：
|
w1870.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
