| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/t0056 |
| 来源ID | Technical Working Paper 0056 |
| Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information | |
| Sanford J. Grossman; Motty Perry | |
| 发表日期 | 1986-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1986 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the seller making an offer which is accepted by buyers with high gains from trade, while buyers with medium gains reject and make a counteroffer which the seller accepts. Buyers with low gains make an unacceptable offer, and then the whole process repeats itself, Numerical simulations demonstrate the effects of uncertainty on the length of bargaining. |
| 主题 | Other |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/t0056 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559160 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sanford J. Grossman,Motty Perry. Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information. 1986. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| t0056.pdf（2108KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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