| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w1935 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1935 |
| Are Efficiency Wages Efficient? | |
| William T. Dickens; Lawrence F. Katz; Kevin Lang | |
| 发表日期 | 1986-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1986 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Efficiency wage models have been criticized because worker malfeasance can be prevented in a pareto efficient manner by requiring workers to post a bond which they lose if they are caught cheating. However, since it is costly to monitor workers and costless to demand a larger bond, firms should pay nothing for monitoring and demand very large bonds. Since we observe that firms devote considerable resources to monitoring workers, bonds must be limited. Therefore firms must use second best alternatives -- intensive monitoring and/or efficiency wages. The payment of efficiency wages cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1935 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559186 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William T. Dickens,Lawrence F. Katz,Kevin Lang. Are Efficiency Wages Efficient?. 1986. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w1935.pdf（93KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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