| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w1948 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 1948 |
| Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion | |
| Julio J. Rotemberg; Garth Saloner | |
| 发表日期 | 1986-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1986 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat of reversion to more competitive pricing. We consider both prices and quantities as the strategic variables and study competition both in the domestic and the foreign market taken individually, and in the two markets taken together. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w1948 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559199 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julio J. Rotemberg,Garth Saloner. Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion. 1986. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w1948.pdf（277KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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