| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w2039
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 2039
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| Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization |
| Joseph S. Tracy
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| 发表日期 | 1986-10-01
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| 出版年 | 1986
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper examines the optimality of several seniority provisions which are common to U.S. union contracts. The paper focuses on the attempts by the initial union members to maximize their return from organizing the union. An overlapping generations model is used in the analysis. Seniority wage increases are found to serve as implicit initiation fees and thus serve as one means of appropriating rents from future union members. Layoff rules are shown to be optimal only when the organizers are constrained in the types of contracts they can write. Without these constraints, the optimal contract provides full insurance making layoff rules unnecessary. The paper concludes with a plausible set of constraints which organizers may face and discusses the conditions necessary for seniority layoff rules to result. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2039
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559293
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Joseph S. Tracy. Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization. 1986.
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文件名：
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w2039.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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