G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w2039
来源IDWorking Paper 2039
Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization
Joseph S. Tracy
发表日期1986-10-01
出版年1986
语种英语
摘要This paper examines the optimality of several seniority provisions which are common to U.S. union contracts. The paper focuses on the attempts by the initial union members to maximize their return from organizing the union. An overlapping generations model is used in the analysis. Seniority wage increases are found to serve as implicit initiation fees and thus serve as one means of appropriating rents from future union members. Layoff rules are shown to be optimal only when the organizers are constrained in the types of contracts they can write. Without these constraints, the optimal contract provides full insurance making layoff rules unnecessary. The paper concludes with a plausible set of constraints which organizers may face and discusses the conditions necessary for seniority layoff rules to result.
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w2039
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559293
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GB/T 7714
Joseph S. Tracy. Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization. 1986.
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