G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w2088
来源IDWorking Paper 2088
A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
Jeremy I. Bulow; Kenneth Rogoff
发表日期1986-12-01
出版年1986
语种英语
摘要Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels. We derive a bargaining equilibrium in which countries with large debts achieve negotiated partial default. The ability to credibly threaten more draconian penalties in the event of repudiation may be of no benefit to lenders. Furthermore, unanticipated increases in world interest rates may actually help the borrowers by making lenders more inpatient for a negotiated settlement. Finally, Western governments may be induced to make payments to facilitate reschedulings even though efficient agreements will be reached without their intervention.
主题International Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w2088
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559342
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jeremy I. Bulow,Kenneth Rogoff. A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt. 1986.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w2088.pdf(510KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Jeremy I. Bulow]的文章
[Kenneth Rogoff]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Jeremy I. Bulow]的文章
[Kenneth Rogoff]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Jeremy I. Bulow]的文章
[Kenneth Rogoff]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w2088.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。