| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2088 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2088 |
| A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt | |
| Jeremy I. Bulow; Kenneth Rogoff | |
| 发表日期 | 1986-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 1986 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels. We derive a bargaining equilibrium in which countries with large debts achieve negotiated partial default. The ability to credibly threaten more draconian penalties in the event of repudiation may be of no benefit to lenders. Furthermore, unanticipated increases in world interest rates may actually help the borrowers by making lenders more inpatient for a negotiated settlement. Finally, Western governments may be induced to make payments to facilitate reschedulings even though efficient agreements will be reached without their intervention. |
| 主题 | International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2088 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559342 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy I. Bulow,Kenneth Rogoff. A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt. 1986. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2088.pdf（510KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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