| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2196 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2196 |
| Privatization, Information and Incentives | |
| David E. M. Sappington; Joseph E. Stiglitz | |
| 发表日期 | 1987-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1987 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, the choice between public and private provision of goods and services is considered. In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference between the two mod- concerns the transactions cats faced by the government when attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention under public ownership can have its advantages; but the fact that a promise not to intervene is more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects, The Fundamental Privatization Theorem (analogous to The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics) is presented, providing conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production. The restrictiveness of these conditions is evaluated. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2196 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559449 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David E. M. Sappington,Joseph E. Stiglitz. Privatization, Information and Incentives. 1987. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2196.pdf（234KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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