| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w2238
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 2238
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| Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital |
| Shulamit Kahn; Kevin Lang
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| 发表日期 | 1987-05-01
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| 出版年 | 1987
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Most models of implicit lifetime contracts imply that at any particular point in time, workers' wages and value of marginal product (VMP) will diverge. As a result, the contract will have to specify hours as well as wages, since firms will desire to prevent workers from working more when the wage is greater than VMP and from working less when the wage is less than VMP. this divergence, combined with the fact that in efficient contracts, the hours are set so that VMP equals the marginal value of leisure, implies that workers will face binding hours constraints. We show that the two major models of lifetime contracts, the agency model and the firm-specific capital model, make opposite predictions regarding the relation between work hours constraints and job tenure. We test these predictions. Our results indicate that neither model of efficient long-term contracts explains the observed pattern of hours constraints. Therefore, we briefly consider other explanations. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2238
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559493
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Shulamit Kahn,Kevin Lang. Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital. 1987.
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文件名：
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w2238.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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