| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2356 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2356 |
| Employee Crime, Monitoring, and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis | |
| William T. Dickens; Lawrence F. Katz; Kevin Lang; Lawrence H. Summers | |
| 发表日期 | 1987-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1987 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper offers some observations on employee crime, economic theories of crime, limits on bonding, and the efficiency wage hypothesis. We demonstrate that the simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring and large penalties for employee crime. Finding overwhelming empirical evidence that firms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance and do not impose extremely large penalties, we investigate a number of possible reasons why the simple model's predictions fail. It turns out that plausible explanations for firms large outlays on monitoring of employees also justify the payment of premium wages in some circumstances. There is no legitimate a priori argument that firms should not pay efficiency wages once it is recognized that they expend significant resources on monitoring. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2356 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559611 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William T. Dickens,Lawrence F. Katz,Kevin Lang,et al. Employee Crime, Monitoring, and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis. 1987. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2356.pdf（174KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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