| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2422 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2422 |
| Bank Financing and Investment Decisions with Asymmetric Information | |
| Deborah Lucas; Robert L. McDonald | |
| 发表日期 | 1987-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1987 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks know more about the quality of their assets than do outside investors. This informational asymmetry can distort investment decisions if the bank must raise funds from uninformed outsiders, and assets sold will be subject to a lemons discount. Using a three-period equilibrium model we examine the effect of asymmetric information about loan quality on the asset and liability decisions of banks and the market valuation of bank liabilities. The existence of a precautionary demand for T-bills against future liquidity needs depends both on the regulatory environment and the informational structure. If banks are ex ante identical, issuing risky debt to fund a deposit outflow is preferred to holding T-bills ex ante. However, if banks have partial knowledge of loan quality, and if their asset choice is observable, they may hold T-bills to signal their quality, enabling them to issue risky debt at a lower interest rate. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Financial Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2422 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559677 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Deborah Lucas,Robert L. McDonald. Bank Financing and Investment Decisions with Asymmetric Information. 1987. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2422.pdf（287KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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