| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2630 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2630 |
| Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure | |
| Richard A. Jensen; Jerry Thursby; Marie Thursby | |
| 发表日期 | 1988-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975-1982. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2630 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/559881 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard A. Jensen,Jerry Thursby,Marie Thursby. Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure. 1988. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2630.pdf（346KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
