全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Infant Industry Protection

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w2864
来源ID	Working Paper 2864
	Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Infant Industry Protection
	Harry Flam; Robert W. Staiger
发表日期	1989-02-01
出版年	1989
语种	英语
摘要	This paper considers the role for infant industry protection when credit markets suffer from adverse risk selection. We show that asymmetric information about firm-specific risk leads to under-funding of the infant industry in a competitive credit market. A small amount of infant industry protection is shown to be welfare improving, and the optimal infant industry tariff is derived. Finally, an alternative government policy of production subsidies is considered under the assumption that the government shares private knowledge with infant industry firms. We argue that a tariff may dominate production subsidies as an entry promoting devise in this context.
主题	International Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w2864
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560131
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Harry Flam,Robert W. Staiger. Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Infant Industry Protection. 1989.