| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2920 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2920 |
| Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy | |
| Barbara J. Spencer; Ronald W. Jones | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine conditions under which a low cost vertically integrated manufacturer has an incentive to export an intermediate product to its higher cost (vertically integrated) rival rather than to vertically foreclose, fully cutting off supplies. The nature of supply conditions in the importing country, the size of an import tariff on the final good and optimal policy by the exporting country are all shown to be important for this decision. The exporting country may gain by taxing exports of the final (Cournot) product even though, under Cournot competition, an export subsidy is optimal in the absence of a market for intermediates. In this case, optimal policy also requires an export tax on intermediates, but the higher tax on final goods serves to divert sales to the more profitable market for intermediates increasing the extent of vertical supply. It is optimal to tax the export of both goods or to subsidize the export of both goods. It is never optimal to tax one and subsidize the other. |
| 主题 | International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2920 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560190 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Barbara J. Spencer,Ronald W. Jones. Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2920.pdf（330KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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