| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w2959 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 2959 |
| Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation | |
| Richard A. Jensen; Marie Thursby | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When governments choose trade policy, rarely do they have complete information, At the time decisions are made, policy makers have only estimates of market responses, as well as the responses of foreign governments. In many realistic situations, even the policy objectives of other governments may not be known. For example, the balance of constitutional powers in the United States is often cited as a source of confusion as to objectives of U.S. trade policy. In this paper we examine the Bayesian Nash equilibria of several noncooperative tariff games with incomplete information, In the models examined, the home country has private information about whether its government is a low or high tariff type. If the foreign government is uncertain about this type in a one-shot game, its Nash equilibrium tariff will be lower (higher) than if it knew the home government were a low (high) tariff type. In two multistage games, misleading behavior by the home government is shown to be an equilibrium strategy for sufficiently high discount factors. Whether the uncertainty is persistent or can be resolved is shown to be important for welfare results in the multistage setting. In the models examined, tariff rules do not necessarily dominate discretionary policy. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w2959 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560234 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard A. Jensen,Marie Thursby. Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w2959.pdf（331KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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