| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3019 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3019 |
| Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework | |
| Joshua Aizenman; Eduardo R. Borensztein | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt repayment is equal to the trade surplus of the debtor. The outcome of the bargaining game will therefore be dependent (among other things) on the level of production in the debtor country. In this framework, the paper shows that productive investment may increase or decrease the bargaining power of the debtor country. This ambiguity appears to be fairly robust. |
| 主题 | International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3019 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560294 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Aizenman,Eduardo R. Borensztein. Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3019.pdf（259KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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