| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3023 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3023 |
| Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets | |
| Barbara J. Spencer; Ronald W. Jones | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A domestic firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated supplier for a key intermediate product when both firms are Cournot competitors in the market for the final product. The foreign supplier generally charges its domestic rival a price for the input that exceeds the independent monopoly level and vertical foreclosure may occur. Domestic policies applied to the vertically related products can increase domestic welfare by reducing the price and increasing the availability of imported supplies of the input. Vertical integration in the foreign supplier has significant implications for all three domestic policies considered: a tariff or subsidy on imports of both products and a domestic production subsidy. The foreign vertically integrated firm tends to reduce its price for the input in response to an import tariff on the final product, whereas a simple monopoly supplier would respond by increasing its export price. Also domestic cost conditions for the production of the input can critically affect the desirability of a tax as apposed to a subsidy on intermediate imports. |
| 主题 | International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3023 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560297 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Barbara J. Spencer,Ronald W. Jones. Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3023.pdf（2207KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
