| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3072 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3072 |
| Moderating Elections | |
| Alberto Alesina; Howard Rosenthal | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices are a function of the composition of the legislature and of the executive. In an institutional setup in which the policy outcome depends upon relative plurality, each voter has incentives to be strategic since the outcome depends upon how everybody else votes. By applying to this game between voters the refinements of Strong Nash and Coalition Proof Nash we prove existence of equilibria with properties which appear intuitive and realistic. In fact, the model has several testable implications which seem consistent with some observed patterns of voting behavior in the United States and perhaps in other democracies in which the executive is directly elected. For instance, the model predicts: a) split-ticket voting; b) for some parameter values, a split government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature; and c) the mid-term electoral cycle. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3072 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560349 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Howard Rosenthal. Moderating Elections. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3072.pdf（362KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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