全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w3108
来源ID	Working Paper 3108
	Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents
	Raquel Fernandez; Jacob Glazer
发表日期	1989-09-01
出版年	1989
语种	英语
摘要	This paper models the wage-contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union also decides, in each period, whether or not to strike for the duration of that period. We show that there exist subgame-perfect equilibria in which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement, although both parties are completely rational and fully informed. This has implications for other inefficient phenomena such as tariff wars, debt negotiations, and wars in general. We characterize the set of equilibria, show that strikes can occur in real time, and discuss extensions of the model such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple recontracting opportunities.
主题	Other ; Econometrics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w3108
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560386
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Raquel Fernandez,Jacob Glazer. Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents. 1989.