| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3262 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3262 |
| Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs | |
| Jason R. Barro; Robert J. Barro | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We studied the relation of CEO pay and turnover to performance and characteristics of companies in a new data set that covers large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. As experience increases, the correlation between compensation and assets diminishes for about four years and then rises back to its initial value. We interpret these findings along the lines of Rosen's matching model, allowing for adjustments of compensation and bank assets and for possible dismissal of the CEO. For continuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay to performance diminishes with experience, and there is no indication that stock or accounting returns are filtered for aggregate returns. Logit regressions relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance. The relevant measure of performance in this context is stock returns filtered for average returns of banks in the same year and geographical region. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3262 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560548 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jason R. Barro,Robert J. Barro. Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs. 1990. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3262.pdf（430KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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