| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3277 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3277 |
| Distributing the Gains from Trade With Incomplete Information | |
| Robert Feenstra; Tracy R. Lewis | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. We solve for the optimal government policies. subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint. We find that the optimal policies take the form of nonlinear tariffs, so that both buyers and sellers of the import face an effective price which exceeds its world level. We find that the tariffs are never complete, in the sense of bringing prices (or all individuals back to their initial level. Rather, it will always be possible to make some individuals strictly better off than at the initial prices, while ensuring that no persons are worse off. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Other |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3277 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560565 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Feenstra,Tracy R. Lewis. Distributing the Gains from Trade With Incomplete Information. 1990. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3277.pdf（183KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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