| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3329 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3329 |
| The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Noncooperative Fiscal Policy | |
| Willem H. Buiter; Kenneth M. Kletzer | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a competitive two-country overlapping generations model with perfect capital mobility, a plan that is individually Pareto optimal (that is Pareto optimal with respect to individual preferences) can be sustained without coordination of national fiscal policies when the fiscal arsenal is restricted to lump-sum taxes and government borrowing. Cooperation is required to achieve a Pareto optimum with respect to the two utilitarian national social welfare functions. Cooperation and international side payments are required to achieve an optimum with respect to a utilitarian global social welfare function. Without international lump-sum transfers, when distortionary taxes on capital income are permitted, Pareto optima with respect to national social welfare functions and global social welfare optima will not be individual Pareto optima: efficiency is traded off for a more desirable intergenerational and international distribution of resources. With nationally provided international public goods, the achievement of individual Pareto efficiency requires coordination of public spending but not of financing. |
| 主题 | International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3329 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560616 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Willem H. Buiter,Kenneth M. Kletzer. The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Noncooperative Fiscal Policy. 1990. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3329.pdf（302KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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