| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w3395
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 3395
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| Externalities, Incentives, and Economic Reforms |
| Joshua Aizenman; Peter Isard
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| 发表日期 | 1990-06-01
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| 出版年 | 1990
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience "overspending," "undertaxing," "overborrowing," and "overinflation" unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyses reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3395
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560684
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Joshua Aizenman,Peter Isard. Externalities, Incentives, and Economic Reforms. 1990.
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文件名：
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w3395.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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