G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w3399
来源IDWorking Paper 3399
Sanctions
Jonathan Eaton; Maxim Engers
发表日期1990-07-01
出版年1990
语种英语
摘要Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) takes to influence the actions of another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used, for example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt or by one government to influence the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of another government. Sanctions can harm the sender as well as the target. The credibility of such sanctions is thus at issue. We examine, in a game-theoretic framework, whether sanctions that harm both parties enable the sender to extract concessions. We find that they can, and that their thrust alone can suffice when they are contingent on the target's subsequent behavior. Even when sanctions are not used in equilibrium, however, how much compliance they can extract typically depends upon the coats that they would impose on each party.
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w3399
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560688
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jonathan Eaton,Maxim Engers. Sanctions. 1990.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w3399.pdf(648KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Jonathan Eaton]的文章
[Maxim Engers]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Jonathan Eaton]的文章
[Maxim Engers]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Jonathan Eaton]的文章
[Maxim Engers]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w3399.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。