| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w3399
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 3399
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| Sanctions |
| Jonathan Eaton; Maxim Engers
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| 发表日期 | 1990-07-01
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| 出版年 | 1990
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) takes to influence the actions of another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used, for example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt or by one government to influence the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of another government. Sanctions can harm the sender as well as the target. The credibility of such sanctions is thus at issue. We examine, in a game-theoretic framework, whether sanctions that harm both parties enable the sender to extract concessions. We find that they can, and that their thrust alone can suffice when they are contingent on the target's subsequent behavior. Even when sanctions are not used in equilibrium, however, how much compliance they can extract typically depends upon the coats that they would impose on each party. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3399
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560688
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jonathan Eaton,Maxim Engers. Sanctions. 1990.
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文件名：
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w3399.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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