| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3502 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3502 |
| Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry | |
| R. Glenn Hubbard; Robert J. Weiner | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is well recognized by economists that long-term contracting under an array of price and non-price provisions may be an efficient response to small-numbers bargaining problems. Empirical work to distinguish such issues from predictions of models of market power and bargaining has been sparse, principally because the necessary data on individual transactions are seldom publicly available. The U.S. natural gas industry is well suited for such tests both because of the small number of buyers (pipelines) and sellers (producers) in each market and the large capital commitments required of transacting parties at the inning of the contract. We present a model of the bilateral bargaining process is natural gas field markets under uncertainty. We identify the 'initial price' as the outcome of the bargaining aver a fixed payment for pipeline to producer, and describe "price-escalator provisions" as a means of making the contract responsive at the margin to changes in the valuation of gas over the term of the agreement. Our econometric work rakes use of a large, detailed data set on during the l950s. Empirical evidence from models of price determination and the use of most-favored-nation clauses is supportive of the theoretical model. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3502 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560797 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | R. Glenn Hubbard,Robert J. Weiner. Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry. 1990. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3502.pdf（1887KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
