G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w3542
来源IDWorking Paper 3542
Contracts and the Market for Executives
Sherwin Rosen
发表日期1990-12-20
出版年1990
语种英语
摘要The paper reviews empirical findings on executive compensation in light of marginal productivity and contract theories. The executive labor market performs three functions. First, control must be distributed and assigned among executives. The most talented executives are efficiently assigned to control positions in the largest firms when talent and the marginal product of control are complements. These gains or rents are partially captured in larger earnings. In fact, the elasticity of top executive pay lies within a tight band around .25 among industries, time periods, and countries where it has been estimated. Second, executive contracts must provide incentives for managers to act in the interests of shareholders. Potential loss of reputation, bonding and takeovers probably substitute for direct monetary incentives in this task. Nevertheless, the elasticity of top executive pay with respect to accounting rates of return lie near 1.0. The elasticity with respect to stock market returns is much smaller, though precisely estimated, near 0.1. Differences of opinion remain on whether the market provides enough incentives to align interests between ownership and control. Third, the market must identify new talent and reassign control over careers from older to younger generations. Competition among executives for top positions and the diminishing incentive effect of future rewards with age implies that compensation should increasingly tilt rewards to current performance over the course of a career. Available evidence supports this prediction.
主题Labor Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w3542
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560863
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GB/T 7714
Sherwin Rosen. Contracts and the Market for Executives. 1990.
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