| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/t0097 |
| 来源ID | Technical Working Paper 0097 |
| Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Howard F. Chang | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a sequential bargaining model of the negotiations in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. We identify the expected outcome of the bargaining process and examine the effects of the legal rules that shape the bargaining. We determine how much value equity holders and debt holders receive under the Chapter 11 process, and compare the value obtained by each class with the 'contractual right' of that class. We identify and analyze three reasons that the equity holders can expect to obtain some value even when the debt holders are not paid in full. Finally, we show how the features of the reorganization process and of the company filing under Chapter 11 affect the division of value, and in this way we provide several testable predictions. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/t0097 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560916 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Howard F. Chang. Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization. 1991. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| t0097.pdf（3258KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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