| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3634 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3634 |
| Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Yeon-Koo Che | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's incentive to sue -- and hence litigation costs -- without sacrificing the defendant's incentive to exercise care. The optimal award to the plaintiff may be less than or greater than the optimal payment by the defendant. The possibility of an out-of-court settlement does not qualitatively affect these results. If the settlement can be monitored, it may be desirable to decouple it as well. |
| 主题 | Other ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3634 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560941 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Yeon-Koo Che. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation. 1991. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3634.pdf（207KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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