| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3647 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3647 |
| Work Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Labor | |
| James B. Rebitzer; Lowell J. Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents an incentive-based dual labor market model. Three implications of the model are emphasized. First, in equilibrium, there is an excess supply of workers to primary jobs. Second, when demand is uncertain, firms may choose a mix of primary and contingent workers to perform the same job, even when these workers are perfect substitutes in production. Third, firms prefer to hire into primary jobs workers with strong job attachment and workers whose preferences lead them to prefer long work hours. We argue that industries with high proportions of part-time workers will tend to have large concentrations of contingent workers. The empirical finding that the wages and benefits of full-time workers are significantly reduced in industries with large concentrations of part-time workers appears consistent with this hypothesis. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3647 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/560954 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James B. Rebitzer,Lowell J. Taylor. Work Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Labor. 1991. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3647.pdf（340KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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