| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3739 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3739 |
| A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Daniel L. Rubinfeld | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes optimal fines in a model in which individuals can commit up to two offenses. The fine for the second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense. There are four natural cases in the model, defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the offense. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In another case, it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders. And in the two remaining cases, the optimal penalty does not change. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3739 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561056 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Daniel L. Rubinfeld. A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders. 1991. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3739.pdf（167KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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