| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w3772
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3772
|
| External Debt and Political Instability |
| Sule Ozler; Guido Tabellini
|
| 发表日期 | 1991-07-01
|
| 出版年 | 1991
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large external debts by developing countries during 1972-81. The theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one regime the borrower is on its demand curve and changes in the loan size demand are accommodated by the lenders. In the other regime the borrower is credit rationed, and the loan size is determined by the perceived country risk. Higher political instability increases the equilibrium loan size in the first regime and decreases it in the second. Using out-of-sample of evidence, we identify the two regimes in the data. We then find that in the unconstrained regime political instability has a significant positive effect on the loan size, whereas it has no significant effect in the credit rationing regime. Hence the evidence indicates a positive effect of political instability on the demand for sovereign loans, as predicted by the theory. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; International Finance
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3772
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561094
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Sule Ozler,Guido Tabellini. External Debt and Political Instability. 1991.
|
|
文件名：
|
w3772.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
