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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w3803 |
来源ID | Working Paper 3803 |
Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market For Pharmaceuticals | |
Richard G. Frank; David S. Salkever | |
发表日期 | 1991-08-01 |
出版年 | 1991 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Empirical studies suggest that entry of generic competitors results in minimal decreases or even increases in brand-name drug prices as well as sharp declines in brand-name advertising. This paper examines circumstances under which this empirical pattern could be observed. The analysis focuses on models where the demand for brand-name pharmaceuticals is divided into two segments, only one of which is cross-price-sensitive. Brand-name firms are assumed to set price and advertising in a Stackelberg context; they allow for responses by generic producers but the latter take decisions by brand-name f inns as given. Brand-name price and advertising responses to entry are shown to depend upon the properties of the reduced-form brand-name demand function. Conditions for positive price responses and negative advertising responses are derived. We also examine the implications for brand-name price levels, and for the brand-name price response to entry, of health sector trends (such as increasing HMO enrollments) that may have the effect of expanding the size of the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market. The paper concludes with a review of recent empirical research and suggestions for future work on the effects of generic entry. |
主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3803 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561129 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard G. Frank,David S. Salkever. Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market For Pharmaceuticals. 1991. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w3803.pdf(223KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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