| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w3877 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 3877 |
| The Consequences of Minimum Wage Laws: Some New Theoretical Ideas | |
| James B. Rebitzer; Lowell J. Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists generally agree that the immediate and direct effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers. However, this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on a model of firm behavior that abstracts from problems of work incentives. In this paper we re-examine the theoretical basis for the consensus view of minimum wage laws. The central finding is that when firms use the threat of dismissal to elicit high levels of work effort, an increase in the minimum wage may have the immediate and direct effect of increasing the level of employment in low wage jobs. The formal logic of our model is similar to that found in the model of labor demand under monopsony. However, unlike the monopsony model, the positive employment effect of the minimum wage emerges in a labor market comprised of a large number of firms competing for the labor services of identical workers. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w3877 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561210 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James B. Rebitzer,Lowell J. Taylor. The Consequences of Minimum Wage Laws: Some New Theoretical Ideas. 1991. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w3877.pdf（236KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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