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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w3897
来源IDWorking Paper 3897
Does Employer Monopsony Power Increase Occupational Accidents? The Case of Kentucky Coal Mines
Shulamit Kahn
发表日期1991-11-01
出版年1991
语种英语
摘要A popular argument for safety regulations is that workers accept dangerous jobs because they have "no choice," or, in other words, because they have few or no alternative employment opportunities. This argument is considered in a game-theoretic framework. Because simultaneous-entry models do not yield pure-strategy equilibria, this paper develops a sequential-entry model to analyze the effect of additional firms on occupational safety. Within the context of the particular functional specification modeled, additional firms (except for the second entrant) lower average accident rates and thus increase occupational safety, consistent with the popular argument. However, with other functional specifications, the model could yield different results. As a result, the paper continues with an empirical investigation of the effect of monopsony power for a particular labor market -- nonunionized Kentucky coal mines in the later 70s -- a labor market which is likely to be particularly susceptible to monopsony. The empirical work shows that areas with many choices of alternative employers within easy driving distance do have lower accident rates. For this labor market, at least, when more alternative choices in the same occupation are offered, average occupational safety levels increase. Policies that improve occupational mobility and the competitiveness of labor markets, therefore, may simultaneously improve occupational safety.
主题Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w3897
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561232
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Shulamit Kahn. Does Employer Monopsony Power Increase Occupational Accidents? The Case of Kentucky Coal Mines. 1991.
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