全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Borrowing Constraints and Two-Sided Altruism With an Application to Social Security

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w3913
来源ID	Working Paper 3913
	Borrowing Constraints and Two-Sided Altruism With an Application to Social Security
	David Altig; Steve J. Davis
发表日期	1991-11-01
出版年	1991
语种	英语
摘要	We develop the implications of borrowing constraints and two-sided altruism in an overlapping generations framework with agents who live three periods. Our analysis identifies six equilibrium patterns of intertemporal and intergenerational linkages in the no-loan economy, one of which corresponds to the traditional lifecycle model, and one of which corresponds to Barro's dynastic model. Novel linkage patterns involve parent-to-child transfers early in the life cycle, child-to-parent gifts late in the life cycle, or both. Capital accumulation behavior and the consequences of fiscal policy interventions depend, often critically, on which linkage patterns prevails. We show how unfunded social security interventions can significantly depress aggregate capital accumulation, even when every generation is linked to its successor generation by altruistic transfers. We also derive a non-Ricardian neutrality result for gift-motive economies that holds whether or not borrowing constraints bind and whether or not parent and child are connected by an operative altruism motive at all points in the life cycle.
主题	Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w3913
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/561247
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	David Altig,Steve J. Davis. Borrowing Constraints and Two-Sided Altruism With an Application to Social Security. 1991.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w3913.pdf（461KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览